I don't think trying to find more trustworthy exit nodes is the answer because it's still possible to get MITM'd on the path between the exit node and service you're actually communicating with even if you trust the exit node. It works to an extent, but #233 points out that there are trust issues with the kind of SSL that's implemented in web browsers and #330 points out that there aren't any fixes for these SSL issues. Many people would point to HTTPS as this secure protocol. Obviously if you don't trust the exit node and the path between the exit node and the service you want to communicate with, then you must have some kind of secure protocol in order to communicate without getting snooped on and/or MITM'd. Reply to this email directly or view it on GitHubĪlex-fischer-70: The trustworthy exit node issue dovetails with other discussions taking place here. I don't think any of the leaked NSA docs have There are many possible theoretical attacks on Tor, but it's not clear A more interesting question wouldīe whether they know where that traffic originated from. To assume all major commercial VPN providers are compromised.Īs for Tor, the NSA is almost certainly observing all the trafficĬoming out of many Tor exit nodes. VPNs are very risky: they are high profile targets. VPN or proxy is not record logs and always adds encryption in your
VPN in some remote server, and be sure it is not record log. You are really paranoid about the major one, then you can setup your own That is the point, VPN with encryption is the safe way to go. I agree the VPNs are risky, but it still safe is the logs remain clearĪt all.
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